
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Cross-Assignment Discrimination in Pay:
A Test Case of Major League Baseball
IZA DP No. 5989
September 2011
Örn B. Bodvarsson
John G. Sessions 
Cross-Assignment Discrimination in Pay: 




Örn B. Bodvarsson 
St. Cloud State University 
and IZA 
 
John G. Sessions 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 




Cross-Assignment Discrimination in Pay: 
A Test Case of Major League Baseball
* 
 
The traditional Becker/Arrow style model of discrimination depicts majority and minority and 
workers as perfectly substitutable inputs, implying that all workers have the same job 
assignment. The model is only appropriate for determining whether pay differences between, 
for example, whites and non-whites doing job assignment A are attributable to prejudice 
(‘within-assignment discrimination’); It is inappropriate, however, for determining whether pay 
differences between whites in job assignment A and non-whites in job assignment B reflect 
discriminatory behaviour (‘cross-assignment discrimination’). We test the model of such cross 
assignment discrimination developed by Bodvarsson and Sessions (2011) using data on 
Major League Baseball hitters and pitchers for four different seasons during the 1990s, a 
decade during which monopsony power fell. We find strong evidence of ceteris paribus racial 
pay differences between hitters and pitchers, as well as evidence that cross-assignment 




The standard approach to measuring pay discrimination is to test a model of majority/minority 
pay differences that assumes all workers are perfect substitutes, i.e. have precisely the same 
human capital endowments and perform precisely the same task. The standard empirical 
approach then is to compare groups of minority and majority workers within the same 
occupation or job classification, e.g. comparing white and non-white nurses or male and 
female airline pilots. The standard model and test are thus unsuitable for assessing 
discrimination across occupations and job classifications, e.g. testing for whether the reason 
white physicians make much higher income than non-white nurses is because of gender 
discrimination. We call this type of discrimination “cross-assignment discrimination” and in a 
previously published paper, we develop the theory behind this approach to studying 
discrimination. This paper provides a test of that theory and our chosen test case is Major 
League Baseball, where white (non-white) hitters (pitchers) are compared with non-white 
(white) pitchers (hitters). We find strong evidence of cross-assignment discrimination 
between hitters and pitchers. 
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1.  Introduction 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, the median weekly earnings of male and 
female elementary and middle school teachers in 2006 were $920 and $824, respectively, 
whereas for male and female school principals and school district superintendents, median 
weekly earnings were $1275 and $1107, respectively.
  During the same year, the median 
weekly earnings of male and female registered nurses were $1074 and $971, respectively, 
whereas  for  male  and  female  physicians  and  surgeons  they  were  $1847  and  $1329, 
respectively. Median weekly earnings of male and female lawyers were $1891 and $1333, 
respectively, whereas for female legal assistants, they were $726 (data on earnings of male 
legal assistants are not available). Median weekly earnings of male and female cooks were 
$377 and $340, respectively, whereas for male and female restaurant waitpersons they were 
$284  and  $348,  respectively.  Finally,  during  2006  the  median  weekly  earnings  of  male 
aircraft pilots and flight engineers were $1419, whereas for female flight attendants, median 
weekly earnings were $488 (data on male flight attendant earnings are not available).
1 
What do the above examples have in common? First, each example involves a pair of 
job assignments within a firm that are distinctly complementary; Pilots and flight attendants 
are  complementary  labour  inputs  in  the  production  of  airline  services,  educational 
administrators and teachers are complements in the provision of educational services whilst 
physicians  and  nurses  complement  one  another  in  the  provision  of  health  care  services. 
Second, in each example for which data on earnings of each gender are available, there are 
noticeable gender pay gaps within job assignments – 9 per cent for school teachers, 20 per 
cent for principals and superintendents, nearly 10 per cent for registered nurses, 28 per cent 
for physicians and surgeons, nearly 30 per cent for lawyers, 10 per cent for cooks and 22.5 
per cent for waitpersons (in favour of females, however). A commonly asked question would 
                                                 
1 These numbers are taken from the Bureau of Labour Statistics website (http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf).   3 
be: How much of these intra-job gender pay gaps are attributable to discrimination? This is 
the approach taken in the traditional wage discrimination model, due originally to Becker 
(1971) and Arrow (1973). This model is based on the fundamental assumption that majority 
and  minority  workers  are  perfect  substitutes  in  production.  Consequently,  the  traditional 
model is only appropriate for studying gender, racial, age, sexual orientation or other group 
pay differences for workers performing the same job assignment. 
In this paper, we address a different and more nuanced question: To what extent is 
majority/minority pay across complementary job assignments within a firm attributable to 
discrimination? For example, how much of the $931 (65.6%) pay gap between male aircraft 
pilots and flight engineers and female transportation attendants, the $1165 pay gap between 
male lawyers and female legal assistants and the $876 pay gap between male physicians and 
surgeons  and  female  registered  nurses,  attributable  to  discrimination?  Are  these  gaps 
primarily attributable to majority/minority productivity differences or to prejudice? This is a 
question about inter-job wage discrimination and it is a far more difficult question because to 
answer it we need to compare majority and minority workers for which there will be both 
distinct productivity and labour supply differences. In the traditional (intra-job assignment) 
model of wage discrimination, details of the production function are dispensed with because 
there  are  no  productivity  and  labour  supply  differences  between  workers.  In  a  study  of 
discrimination across job assignments, however, the production and labour supply functions 
must be given explicit consideration.  
In  what  follows  we  empirically  test  the  model  of  pay  discrimination  across  job 
assignments developed by Bodvarsson and Sessions (2011) - hereafter BO - on an industry 
characterized by complementary job assignments, racial integration, variation in monopsony 
power across worker  groups  and a history of racial discrimination  –  U.S.  Major  League 
Baseball.   4 
We  employ  a  novel,  two-stage  regression  methodology  in  which  a  standardised 
measure (i.e. common) measure of productivity is estimated separately for each occupation. 
We then incorporate this measure as a right-hand-side explanatory variable in a second-stage, 
all-occupation  regression  designed  to  estimate  cross-assignment  discrimination.  Our 
empirical analysis finds convincing evidence of racial differences in pay across player job 
assignments, even after controlling for a wide array of demographic variables and position-
specific productivity. Moreover, we find strong evidence of BO’s theoretical prior that racial 
pay differentials across assignments are affected by changes in relative productivities. 
The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the previous literature on 
the economics of discrimination whilst Section 4 outlines our test case of Major  League 
Baseball. Our empirical analysis is presented in Section 5 whilst final comments are collected 
in Section 6.  
2.  Previous Literature 
While  most  of  the  literature  on  discrimination  has  focused  on  the  measurement  of  the 
majority/minority pay gap within the same job category, some researchers have suggested 
that  the  required  assumption  of  perfect  substitution  between  inputs  may  be  somewhat 
inappropriate. Indeed, Becker alluded to this issue by sketching a brief extension to his two-
factor black/white worker model to a three-factor model [see Becker (1971, pp. 59-62)]. Two 
of the factors are perfectly substitutable blacks and whites that belong to a group that could 
be termed ‘Type 1 Labour.’ Then, there is a third labour input, ‘Type 2 Labour,’ that both 
discriminates against blacks and is complementary to, or imperfectly substitutable, for them. 
Type 2 workers could, for example, be managers. In this situation, Becker showed that there 
would be a ceteris paribus black/white wage gap within the Type 1 category. Arrow (1973) 
elaborated on this by showing that the black/white wage gap depends upon the sensitivity of   5 
Type 2 labour’s reservation wage to the fraction of the firm’s labour force that is black, as 
well as the importance of Type 2 labour as an input (importance is measured as the size of the 
payments to Type 2 labour relative to Type 1 labour). Neither Becker nor Arrow tested these 
propositions,  nor  did  they  investigate  further  the  implications  of  complementarity  in 
production for the black/white pay differential.  
  Welch (1967) raised the possibility that blacks and whites working in the same firm 
may  not  be  perfect  substitutes  because  there  may  be  differences  in  their  educational 
endowments. Welch suggested that, perhaps because of long-term discrimination, blacks may 
have acquired less schooling and/or attended lower quality schools. He modelled educational 
endowments  and  physical  labour  as  separate  factors  of  production,  allowing  for  racial 
differences in educational endowments and, following Becker and Arrow, white co-worker 
discrimination. He argued that if firms choose racially integrated labour forces then blacks 
and whites must be complementary inputs. The intuition is that because of whites’ aversion 
to working with blacks, integration creates inefficiencies that will cause joint product to be 
less than the sum of individual black and white worker marginal products. The firm will 
therefore  follow  an  apartheid  employment  policy  unless  there  are  sufficiently  large 
complementarities to be exploited, i.e. if the gains from complementarity exceed the losses 
attributable to co-worker discrimination.
2  
More recently, Kahn (1991)  sets out a model of customer discrimination  in which 
whites and blacks are represented as different inputs in the production function. He models 
blacks and whites as distinct inputs because if customers are prejudiced, they will act as if the 
amount of black input is equal to just a fraction of the input of  otherwise identical white 
workers. Similarly, Bodvarsson and Partridge (2001) present a model of a professional sports 
                                                 
2 Borjas (2008) also suggested that differential educational attainments may render black and white workers as imperfect 
substitutes: ‘The two groups of workers might have different productivities because they might differ in the amount and 
quality of educational attainment, or because they might have been employed in different occupations and hence are entering 
(a) firm with different types of job training. [Borjas (2008), p. 128)].    6 
team where white and non-white athletes are imperfect substitutes due to racial differences in 
prior training and experience.
3  
  An extensive empirical literature on wage discrimination emerged during the 1970s, 
all  based  on  the  original  Becker-Arrow  model  of  perfect  substitution.  The  accumulating 
evidence  was  called  into  question  in  the  early  1980s,  however,  as  a  number  of  studies 
concluded  that  racial  and  ethnic  groups  were  not  perfectly  substitutable.  These  studies 
typically  applied  econometric  models  of  Translog  or  Generalized  Leontief  aggregate 
production functions to estimate elasticities of complementarity between groups. Grant and 
Hamermesh (1981), for example, found that black adults are imperfect substitutes for white 
men and complements to white women and youths; Borjas (1983) provided evidence which 
suggested that whilst black males were imperfect substitutes for white males, Hispanic males 
and white males were complementary; Borjas (1987) showed that black natives are imperfect 
substitutes for white natives; and Kahanec (2006) founds that non-whites are complementary 
to whites.  
  The  traditional  empirical  approach  for  testing  wage  discrimination  is  generally 
unsuitable  where  cross-assignment  discrimination  is  concerned  because  it  is  based  on  a 
presumption that whites and non-whites are perfect substitutes. While empirical researchers 
have usually controlled for job assignment differences with dummy variables, that approach 
has severe limitations because it fails to adequately control for the structure of the underlying 
production function. As Hashimoto and Kochin (1980) argue, failure to account for any and 
all sources of productivity differences will lead to biased estimates of discrimination.  
  In a recent theoretical contribution, BO extend the traditional Becker-Arrow model to 
ascertain how predictions regarding cross-assignment discrimination vary with the form of 
                                                 
3 Both of these models, however, have features that limit their applicability. In Kahn’s model, whites and non-
whites  are  assigned  the  same  job  and  would  be  perfect  substitutes  if  customers  were  unprejudiced  whilst 
Bodvarsson and Partridge impose the restriction that the cross elasticity of demand for white labour with respect 
to non-white labour is negative.   7 
the production function. Using an approach similar to Kahn (1991), BO measure the extent of 
customer prejudice against non-white workers by a parameter, D.
4 Customer prejudice may 
be  interpreted  as a situation  in which  customers discount the marginal revenue product 
(MRP) of non-white workers. The lower (higher) is D, the more (less) intense is the prejudice 
and the lower (higher) is non-white MRP. Prejudice dissipates as D approaches 1 and reaches 
a maximum as D falls to 0. While it is traditional to think of customer discrimination as 
implying  a  price  discount  on  the  output  of  non-white  workers,  the  approach  above  is 
equivalent.  The  parameter  D  reflects  the  idea  that  non-white  labour  is  valued  less  when 
customers are prejudiced.
5 In terms of the Generalized Leontief function (GLF), for example, 
the impact of D is seen as follows: 










2  (1) 
where D ≤ 1, Q is output, 
W
i X is the quantity of white labour input i,  Xj
NWis the quantity of 
non-white labour input  j, and  ij g is the technology coefficient. Note there are a total of 2k 
inputs – two groups of workers within each job assignment (white and non-white) x k job 
assignments.  
                                                 
4 Note that prejudice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for discrimination. It is only when prejudicial thoughts are 
acted upon through, for example, exercising product market demand that they can result in discriminatory outcomes in the 
labour market. In general, taste discrimination in pay and hiring is a market outcome that results from employers acting upon 
their own racial preferences and/or implementing the racial preferences of customers or co-workers.  
5 BO’s approach implies that consumers can discern the racial characteristics of workers when purchasing or consuming the 
particular good or service in question. Such an assumption is not unrealistic and examples abound of environments in which 
such an approach to discounting non-white MRP is likely to hold. At professional sports events, white (non-white) fans 
witness non-white (white) players’ contribution to athletic entertainment. If sports fans of one skin colour are prejudiced 
against players of another colour, this may result in lower pay to the latter group. A similar situation may arise in other 
entertainment services, e.g. films, theatre, popular music. More generally, there are many production situations in which 
consumers must interact with minority workers in order for a good or service to be dispensed, e.g. white patients interacting 
with  non-white  nurses or doctors,  non-white  clients  interacting with  white  legal  advisers,  and white  airline  passengers 
interacting with non-white flight attendants. There will also be cases where prejudiced white consumers may not necessarily 
see non-white workers during the act of purchase or consumption, but mere knowledge of the racial composition of the work 
force may influence buying decisions. For example, white consumers may place a lower valuation on, or even refuse to 
purchase, food products, or appliance repair services, or the processing of important financial transactions, knowing that 
those goods or services were manufactured or performed by non-white workers.    8 
BO then apply Becker’s (1971) Market Discrimination Coefficient (MDC) to the case 
of discrimination across job groups. The MDC measures the ceteris paribus racial earnings 
gap viz. the percentage earnings premium paid to whites. If the white and non-white wage is 
denoted by r












  (2) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (2) is the wage ratio when there is prejudice (i.e. 
when D <1) whereas the second term is the wage ratio in the absence of prejudice (i.e. when 
D = 1). The MDC is the difference between the two ratios and measures the ceteris paribus 
racial pay gap.  
Applying  equation  (2)  to  the  case  of  cross-assignment  discrimination,  the  ceteris 




W D <1 ( )
r2
NW D <1 ( )
-
r 1
W D =1 ( )
r2
NW D =1 ( )
  (3) 
Similarly, the ceteris paribus racial pay gap between whites performing job 2 and non-whites 
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  (4) 
BO  derive  the  above  measure of  cross-assignment  discrimination  for  four  different 
production  functions  -  Generalized  Leontief,  Quadratic,  CES,  and  Cobb –Douglas.  The 
Generalized Leontief provides the most general results, although closed form solutions are 
not possible. Closed form solutions, which are obtainable from the other three functions but 
only under restrictive assumptions, suggest that most predictions are generally robust across   9 
functional forms and that cross-assignment discrimination depends upon productivity and 
labour supply differences between the various worker groups, labour market structure, and 
the  interaction  between  relative  group  productivity  and  prejudice.  A  uniform  prediction 
across all four production functions is that changes in the relative productivity of one racial 
group induce changes in cross-assignment discrimination. For example, in all four cases, 
higher white (non-white) productivity raises (lowers) the amount of discrimination.
6 This is 
an important finding, both academically and in terms of policy. If  non-whites are able to 
improve their skill-base, or if technological progress impacts more favorably on non-whites 
relative to  whites,  then  cross-assignment discrimination  may  be reduced.  An increase in 
white productivity, however, will lead to an unintended adverse consequence by increasing 
discrimination against non-whites.  
Table 1 following summarises BO’s various comparative static results for the ceteris 
paribus white/non-white pay differential (i.e.  MDCNW2
W1 ) derived from the four p roduction 
functions: 
Table  1:  BO’s  Comparative  Static  Results  for  Cross-Assignment  Discrimination 
¶MDCNW2
W1 ¶Variable ( ) 
Variable  Generalized 
Leontief 
Quadratic  CES  Cobb-
Douglas 
Strength of Prejudice (D)  -  -  -  - 
White productivity  +  +  +  ± 
Non-white productivity  -  -  -  ± 
White productivity x D   -  -  -   
Non-white productivity x D      +   
White labour supply      -   
Non-white labour supply      +   
White reservation wage        + 
Non-white reservation wage        - 
Employer’s monopsony power        ± 
Degree of monopsonistic wage discrimination        - 
 
BO’s  findings  have  an  important  general  implication:  Researchers  must  control  for  both 
                                                 
6 Whilst BO frame their theoretical model in terms of racial discrimination, it is clearly applicable to other types of labour 
market discrimination, for example, where workers are discriminated against on account of their age, gender, nativity status, 
sexual orientation, religious affiliations, or other characteristics that may be targets of employer, employee, or consumer 
prejudice.  10 
productivity differences  between white and non-white workers, as well as the interaction 
between  race  and  productivity,  when  estimating  the  extent  of  cross-assignment 
discrimination.  
2.  A Test Case: Major League Baseball 
In order to test empirically the BO model of cross-assignment discrimination, we searched 
for an appropriate test case viz. an industry where: (i) there are accurate data on salaries and 
productivity  for  individual  workers  across  distinct  job  assignments  and  these  data  are 
available for different firms; (ii) the productivities of job assignment groups within the firm 
are interrelated; (iii) there is racial integration; (iv) the pay of some workers is competitively 
determined, whilst the pay of others is determined under conditions resembling monopsony; 
(v) there is potential for customer discrimination; and (vi) there have been changes in the 
number of employers in the industry over time. 
  One  industry  satisfying  all  these  criteria  is  Major  League  Baseball  (MLB)  in  the 
USA.
7  In MLB, each team requires two distinctly complementary types of player skill  - 
hitting (an offensive skill) and pitching (a defensive skill)  - in the production of baseball 
entertainment.
8 Player salaries are set under two different regimes, one competitive, the other 
monopsonistic. The monopsonistic regime applies to players with fewer than six years of 
MLB experience. These players are subject to the  reserve  clause  and  are  constrained  to 
negotiate their pay with only one team. The competitive regime applies to players with at 
least 6 years of MLB experience. They are eligible to file for free agency and may negotiate 
with any team in the league. Monopsony power effectively begins to erode, however, as early 
                                                 
7 Racial discrimination in professional sports has received considerable attention among labour economists because of the 
abundant statistical evidence on a player’s personal attributes, compensation and productivity. Most studies in this area have 
focused  on  discrimination  with  respect  to  pay,  hiring,  retention  and  positional  segregation.  For  an  examination  of  the 
research prior to 2000, see Kahn’s (2000) expository survey.  
8 Woolway (1997) and Zech (1981) argue th at the Cobb-Douglas function is a particularly appropriate description of an 
MLB  team’s production  situation.  They  both  estimated  Cobb-Douglas  functions where  the  dependent  variable is  team 
winning percentage and the independent variables are player and team career statistics.  11 
as the fourth year because then a player is eligible for final offer arbitration. Arbitration 
rights tend to relieve players of monopsonistic exploitation because arbitrators strive to award 
competitive salaries. Pitchers have historically been disproportionately white, whereas the 
pool of hitters has tended to be more racially balanced. The Major League added new teams 
(called ‘expansion teams’) since the early 1990s, leading to a reduction in each team’s degree 
of monopsony power held over reserve clause players.  
  The ideal way to measure a Major League player’s marginal revenue product (MRP) 
is by his contribution to the team’s ticket, broadcasting and merchandise revenues. Because 
of  the  team  production  nature  of  baseball,  however,  it  is  impossible  to  empirically 
disentangle one player’s revenue contribution from  another. We thus  proxy MRP by the 
player’s years of MLB experience, tenure with his current team, and various career statistics 
(computed  on  a  game-by-game  basis  since  the  beginning  of  the  player’s  Major  League 
career) that proxy his ability and skills. The career statistics we use to measure a hitter’s 
productivity include at bats, stolen bases, bases on balls, total bases, slugging average and 
batting average. We distinguish between hitters that are ‘designated hitters’ from those who 
are not. A designated hitter is a player who is chosen at the start of the game to bat in lieu of 
the pitcher in the line-up. We also distinguish, using dummies, between hitters that serve 
other types of positions. These include whether the hitter served as an infielder or a catcher. 
We measure a pitcher’s productivity by use of the following career statistics: Wins, Losses, 
Games  Started,  Complete  Games,  Saves,  Homeruns,  Walks,  Strikeouts,  Innings  Pitched, 
Earned Run Average (ERA,) and Strikeout Rate. An explanation of baseball terminology is 
set out in the Appendix.   12 
3  Empirical Analysis 
3.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for hitters and pitchers, respectively. Our full 
sample comprises 1093 hitters (549 white, 367 black and 177 Hispanic) and 1204 pitchers 
(942 white, 127 black and 135 Hispanic). Salary, experience, performance and position data 
were  drawn  from  the  Lahman  Baseball  Database  (see:  www.baseball1.com)  over  four 
seasons - 1992, 1993, 1997 and 1998. The Major League expanded by two teams between 
1992 and 1993 and again by two teams between 1997 and 1998. The salary data do not 
include  information  about  contract  length,  bonus  clauses  or  endorsements.  Salaries  for 
players on the Canadian teams were converted to U.S. dollars. The experience data were used 
to determine the player’s eligibility for free agency and final offer arbitration and the player’s 
race was inferred from inspection of Topps baseball cards for all four seasons. For the U.S. 
teams, metropolitan area population and per-capita income were obtained from the website of 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (see: www.bea.gov). For the Canadian teams, similar data 
were obtained from the Statistics Canada website (see: www.statcan.ca). Per-capita income 
data for the Canadian cities were converted to U.S. dollars. 
It would appear from Table 2 that there are no major differences between the personal 
and professional characteristics of white hitters, black hitters and Hispanic hitters, nor in the 
characteristics  of  the  greater  metropolitan  area  in  which  they  play.  In  terms  of  career 
characteristics, however, black hitters record significantly more At Bats, Stolen Bases, Bases 
on Balls and Total Basses than either white hitters or Hispanic hitters. They are also less 
likely to play as an infielder or catcher, but more likely to play as an outfielder or designated 
hitter. Compared to Hispanic hitters, white hitters record significantly more At Bats, Bases on 
Balls and Total Bases, but significantly fewer Stolen Bases. They are also more likely to play 
as a catcher, but less likely to play as an outfielder or designated hitter.   13 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Hitters 
  All  White  Black  Hispanic 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
Personal Characteristics                 
Log Annual Salary  13.890  1.13  13.865  1.10  13.938  1.13  13.866  1.22 
Age  30.304  3.70  30.596  3.49  30.488  3.95  29.023  3.55 
White  0.502  0.500  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Black  0.336   0.472  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Hispanic  0.162    0.369  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Professional Characteristics                 
MLB Experience  7.061  3.89  7.062  3.87  7.223  4.07  6.723  3.55 
MLB Experience-Squared  64.957  69.31  64.785  70.06  68.684  74.23  57.763  54.59 
Tenure with Current Club  2.672  3.00  3.062  3.38  2.305  2.62  2.226  2.24 
Free Agent  0.600  0.49  0.598  0.49  0.605  0.49  0.599  0.49 
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration  0.296  0.46  0.304  0.46  0.294  0.46  0.271  0.45 
American League  0.514  0.50  0.521  0.50  0.469  0.50  0.588  0.49 
National League  0.486  0.50  0.479  0.50  0.057  0.23  0.124  0.33 
Canadian Team  0.073  0.26  0.067  0.25  7.223  4.07  6.723  3.55 
Performance                 
At Bats  2506.414  2001.58  2419.738  1940.51  2699.202  2198.95  2375.525  1720.23 
Stolen Bases  69.746  112.52  44.800  72.35  111.055  157.89  61.480  69.63 
Bases on Balls  254.275  247.74  253.131  233.32  285.349  293.87  193.39  161.14 
Total Bases  1060.200  913.52  1016.772  880.39  1162.845  1013.19  982.073  771.85 
Slugging Average  0.407  0.06  0.404  0.06  0.416  0.06  0.397  0.07 
Batting Average  0.267  0.03  0.264  0.02  0.271  0.02  0.266  0.02 
Infielder  0.459  0.50  0.556  0.50  0.281  0.45  0.531  0.50 
Outfielder  0.383  0.49  0.217  0.41  0.657  0.48  0.333  0.47 
Catcher  0.116  0.32  0.189  0.39  0.016  0.13  0.096  0.30 
Designated Hitter  0.059  0.24  0.046  0.21  0.079  0.27  0.056  0.23 
Greater Metro Area Characteristics                 
Percentage White  80.507  6.89  80.938  6.77  80.683  6.72  78.808  7.39 
Percentage Black  13.273  6.58  12.959  6.60  13.676  6.62  13.409  6.44 
Percentage Hispanic  10.621  10.65  10.719  10.80  10.331  10.58  10.918  10.36 
Average Annual Income ($)  25562.990  3789.65 25508.570  3757.99 25551.300  3731.59  25756.00  4016.17 
Population
1  5514009  4657988  5313189  4509095  5513759  4729589  6137413  4927354 
Year Dummies                 
1992  0.250  0.43  0.255  0.44  0.243  0.43  0.249  0.43 
1993  0.235  0.42  0.248  0.44  0.237  0.43  0.192  0.40 
1997  0.260  0.44  0.248  0.43  0.270  0.44  0.277  0.45 
1998  0.255  0.44  0.250  0.43  0.251  0.43  0.282  0.45 
Sample Size  1093  549  367  177 
Note:  
1. Population denotes the greater metro area population; 
2. Source: All variables except Race and Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, 
Release Date: Dec. 15, 2002). Race is derived form observed Topps Baseball Cards, years 92, 93, 94, 97, 99 (only years available). GMAC derived 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Pitchers 
  All  White  Black   Hispanic  
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev  Mean  Std. Dev 
Personal Characteristics                 
Log Annual Salary  13.409  1.19  13.451  1.20  13.238  1.16  13.276  1.18 
Age  29.815  4.09  30.190  4.02  29.016  4.00  27.948  4.03 
White  0.782  0.41  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Black  0.105  0.31  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Hispanic  0.162  0.37  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Professional Characteristics                 
MLB Experience  5.988  4.20  6.158  4.20  5.772  4.49  5.000  3.75 
MLB Experience-Squared  53.468  76.64  55.562  78.38  53.331  75.31  38.985  63.34 
Tenure with Current Club  1.924  2.07  1.935  2.10  1.843  1.97  1.926  1.99 
Free Agent  0.467  0.50  0.482  0.50  0.441  0.50  0.385  0.49 
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration  0.306  0.46  0.314  0.46  0.236  0.43  0.319  0.47 
American League  0.513  0.50  0.518  0.50  0.543  0.50  0.452  0.50 
National League  0.487  0.50  0.475  0.50  0.528  0.50  0.556  0.50 
Canadian Team  0.069  0.25  0.063  0.24  0.055  0.23  0.126  0.33 
Performance                 
Starter  0.442  0.50  0.441  0.50  0.402  0.49  0.489  0.50 
Wins  37.446  44.33  39.007  45.27  34.386  42.41  29.430  38.34 
Losses  34.179  37.05  35.904  38.37  29.236  30.11  26.785  32.12 
Games Started  74.12  105.53  77.769  108.53  59.646  92.16  62.274  93.98 
Complete Games  10.15  22.24  10.981  23.33  6.433  14.87  7.844  19.65 
Shutouts  2.875  6.08  3.065  6.32  1.984  4.74  2.385  5.35 
Saves  19.488  51.87  20.941  52.93  19.362  62.60  9.474  26.16 
Homeruns  56.517  62.57  58.842  64.46  50.409  52.94  46.044  56.11 
Walks  225.779  249.73  231.782  257.66  224.095  217.58  185.474  217.41 
Strikeouts  436.641  514.13  450.726  530.21  436.047  490.18  338.919  402.35 
Innings Pitched  627.59  702.43  655.160  720.78  558.969  620.14  499.785  627.21 
ERA  4.025  0.96  3.995  0.94  4.175  1.11  4.094  0.97 
Strikeout Rate  0.078  0.02  0.078  0.02  0.083  0.02  0.079  0.02 
Greater Metro Area Characteristics                 
Percentage White  80.714  6.84  80.695  6.91  80.335  6.56  81.201  6.59 
Percentage Black  13.038  6.46  12.946  6.49  14.026  6.46  12.750  6.19 
Percentage Hispanic  10.975  10.77  10.899  10.61  10.909  10.40  11.573  12.20 
Average Annual Income ($)  25488.2  3939.85  25491.51  3895.30  25852.23  3898.44  25122.19  4271.98 
Population
1  5551948  4683875  5481401  4631793  6035905  4915887  5588930  4829139 
Year Dummies                 
1992  0.221  0.42  0.236  0.42  0.189  0.39  0.148  0.36 
1993  0.239  0.43  .248  0.43  0.244  0.43  0.170  0.38 
1997  0.264  0.44  .256  0.44  0.276  0.45  0.311  0.46 
1998  0.276  0.45  .260  0.44  0.291  0.46  0.370  0.48 
Sample Size  1204  942  127  135 
Note:  
1. Population denotes the greater metro area population; 
2. Source: All variables except Race and Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, 
Release Date: Dec. 15, 2002). Race is derived form observed Topps Baseball Cards, years 92, 93, 94, 97, 99 (only years available). GMAC derived 
from the Statistical Abstract 1997-1999, the BEA, CA1-3, and from Statistical Canada 
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In Table 3, the domination of white pitchers is immediately apparent. White pitchers 
are on average older than both black and (especially) Hispanic pitchers. They also enjoy 
higher average earnings. In terms of career characteristics, white pitchers record significantly 
higher Wins, Losses, Games Started, Complete Games, Shutouts, Saves, Homeruns, Walks, 
Strikeouts and Innings Pitched than either blacks or Hispanic pitchers, with Hispanic pitchers 
recording generally lower figures than black pitchers. 
3.2  Empirical Methodology 
Wage discrimination occurs when individuals who are identical in terms of their productive 
characteristics are paid differently on account of their non-productive characteristics. Any 
empirical analysis of discrimination thus requires some control of productivity - it would not 
be surprising, and nor would it suggest discrimination, if more productive individuals were 
paid more than less productive individuals. In the traditional literature such control is usually 
straightforward  since  the  individuals  under  scrutiny  are  performing  the  same  job.  In  our 
model, however, it is problematic. Our concern is whether there is discrimination across job 
assignments,  that  is,  where  individuals  with  different  non-productive  characteristics  are 
performing different jobs - do male airline pilots earn more than female flight attendants 
because of their occupation or because of their gender? This is a difficult issue to address 
empirically because we need to control for the productivity of both the pilot and the flight 
attendant or, more generally, we need to control for assignment-specific productivity. Clearly 
some  measures  of  productivity  will  be  common  across  job  assignments  -  for  example, 
education, job-tenure, and labour market experience. By definition, however, some measures 
of productivity will be unique to particular job assignments and it is controlling for these that 
is the real challenge.  16 
One possible solution is to adopt a two-stage generated regressor approach.
9 Assume 
that wages reflect productivity as follows:  To ascertain the level of discrimination across 
player positions, we need to control for position-specific productivity. In one sense this is 
straightforward because some measures of off-field productivity (MLB experience and tenure 
with current team, for example) are common across pitchers and hitters. On-field measures of 
productivity, however, vary across hitters and pitchers; e.g. runs for hitters and strike-outs for 
pitchers. Given our objective of ascertaining the extent of racial discrimination across job 
assignments, we need a standardized productivity measure. We thus adopt the following two-
stage approach. We first assume that wages reflect productivity as follows: 
0 0 1 1 ln
ij j ij ij w        (5) 
   lnw
ij
 denotes the log wage of a member of group  i =1,2,...,I employed in job assignment 
j =1,2,...,J,  0
j   is a vector of ‘assignment-specific’ productivity measures,  1   is a vector 
of ‘common’ (i.e. cross assignment) productivity measures (e.g. education, tenure), and the 
B’s denote parameter vectors. Our aim is to derive an estimating equation of the form: 
0 0 1 1 ln
ij ij ij w        (6) 
where  0   denotes some standardised (imputed) measure of assignment-specific productivity. 
To this end, we estimate the following ‘first-stage’ group-assignment regressions:  
00 ln
ij j ij w     (7) 
That is, we estimate separate wage regressions for each racial group employed within each 
job assignment, including as explanatory variables only each group’s respective assignment-
                                                 
9  See  Pagan  (1984),  Gauger  (1989)  and  Gawande  (1996)  for  discussions  of  the  inference  issues  regarding  estimated 
regressor models.   17 
specific productivity measures. Thus, we estimate separate wage regressions for black, white 
and  Hispanic  hitters  and  pitchers  on  only  their  respective  position-specific  variables  vis. 
Pitchers  -  Starter;  Wins;  Losses;  Games  Started;  Complete  Games;  Shutouts;  Saves; 
Homeruns; Walks; Strikeouts; Innings Pitched; ERA; and Strikeout Rate; Hitters – At Bat; 
Stolen Bases; Bases on Balls; Total Bases; Slugging Average; Batting Average; Infielder; 
Outfielder; Catcher; and Designated Hitter. We then use the predicted values from these 
regressions,  ˆ w = ˆ w
ij;"i, j ( ), as a standardized measure of assignment-specific productivity in 
second-stage regressions of the form: 
0 1 1 ˆ ln
ij ij ij ww       (8) 
3.3  Cross-Assignment Regression Analysis 
Table 4 reports six second-stage regressions with white pitchers, black pitchers, Hispanic 
pitchers, white hitters, black hitters, and Hispanic hitters being defined as the default race-
position category respectively.  
The results in Table 4 show strong evidence of both cross- and within-assignment 
discrimination in MLB. Our estimated coefficients suggest that even after controlling for 
both on-and off-field productivity, white pitchers earn: (i) 16.4 per cent more than black 
pitchers; (ii) 17.0 per cent more than black hitters; (iii) 10.6 per cent more than black hitters; 
and (iv) 9.2 per cent (but only at the 90 per cent level of confidence) more than Hispanic 
hitters. Hispanic pitchers earn: (i) 17.0 per cent more than black pitchers; (ii) 17.6 per cent 
more  than  white  hitters;  and  (iii)  11.2  per  cent  (but  only  at  the  90  per  cent  level  of 
confidence) more than black hitters. 
  We estimated a number of variants of the Table 4 regressions to test BO’s theoretical 
prior that discrimination increases with heightened customer prejudice, but can decline as 
labour  markets  become  less  competitive.  Specifically,  we  re-estimated  the  Table  4  18 
regressions for the ‘competitive’ and ‘non-competitive’ MLB markets separately, where the 
latter  is  defined  as  those  players  subject  to  the  reserve  clause  or  eligible  for  final  offer 
arbitration. We also estimated separate Table 4 regressions for the ‘early’ (i.e. 1992 and 
1993) and ‘latter’ (i.e. 1997 and 1998) periods of our data, both for the overall MLB market, 
and then for the competitive and non-competitive markets separately. Our objective here was 
to pick up the effects of the expansion in the size of the league, and the subsequent decline in 
monopsony  power,  during  the  1990’s.  Finally,  we  tested  for  customer  discrimination 
generally, and the predictions from BO’s theoretical analysis particularly (i.e. that within a 
competitive labour market, an increase in customer prejudice will heighten the amount of 
wage discrimination across job assignments), by estimating separate Table 4 regressions for 
all players, ‘competitive’ players, and ‘non-competitive’ players, playing for teams located in 
greater metropolitan areas with above and below average non-white populations. 
The results of these various regressions (over 80 in total) are available on request. For 
brevity  we  report  the  salient  details  only.  We  find  discrimination  to  be  generally  more 
evident in the competitive MLB market than in the non-competitive MLB market, and also 
more evident in the ‘latter’ (i.e. post-expansion) period of our data than in the ‘early’ (i.e. 
‘pre-expansion’) period. Breaking the analysis down further, discrimination appears to be 
more prevalent in the competitive MLB market in the latter period than it is in either the 
competitive market in the early period or the non-competitive market in the latter period, 
both  of  which  exhibit  more  discrimination  than  the  non-competitive  market  in  the  early 
period. In terms of customer discrimination, we find substantial evidence of discrimination in 
greater metropolitan areas with below average non-white populations, but less compelling 
evidence in those with above average non-white population. And finally, in terms of the 
former areas, discrimination appears to be more widespread in the competitive rather than in  
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Table 4: Discrimination Controlling for Position Specific Productivity 
Dependent Variable: Log Annual Salary 
 
(1) All  
Default – White 
Pitcher 
(2) All 
Default - Black 
Pitcher 
(3) All  
Default – Hispanic 
Pitcher 
(4) All  
Default – White  
Hitter 
(5) All 
Default - Black 
Hitter 
(6) All  
Default - Hispanic 
Hitter 
  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat 
Imputed Productivity  0.863  34.05  0.863  34.05  0.863  34.05  0.863  34.05  0.863  34.05  34.05  34.05 
Race Dummies                         
White Pitcher   -  -  0.164  2.69  -0.005  -0.09  0.170  4.98  0.106  2.60  0.092  1.79 
Black Pitcher  -0.164  -2.69  -  -  -0.170  -2.15  0.006  0.09  -0.058  -0.87  -0.072  -0.98 
Hispanic Pitcher  0.005  0.09  0.170  2.15  -  -  0.176  2.81  0.112  1.70  0.097  1.35 
White Hitter  -0.170  -4.98  -0.006  -0.09  -0.176  -2.81  -  -  -0.064  -1.52  -0.078  -1.46 
Black Hitter  -0.106  -2.70  0.058  0.87  -0.112  -1.70  0.064  1.52  -  -  -0.014  -0.25 
Hispanic Hitter  -0.092  -1.79  0.072  0.98  -0.097  -1.35  0.078  1.46  0.014  0.25  -  - 
Professional Characteristics                        
Age  -0.024  -3.27  -0.024  -3.27  -0.024  -3.27  -0.024  -3.27  -0.024  -3.27  -0.024  -3.27 
MLB Experience  0.152  3.45  0.152  3.45  0.152  3.45  0.152  3.45  0.152  3.45  0.152  3.45 
MLB Experience-Squared  -0.010  -4.79  -0.010  -4.79  -0.010  -4.79  -0.010  -4.79  -0.010  -4.79  -0.010  -4.79 
Tenure  0.056  10.00  0.056  10.00  0.056  10.00  0.056  10.00  0.056  10.00  0.056  10.00 
Free Agent  0.879  6.14  0.879  6.14  0.879  6.14  0.879  6.14  0.879  6.14  0.879  6.14 
Final Offer Arbitration  0.471  5.94  0.471  5.94  0.471  5.94  0.471  5.94  0.471  5.94  0.471  5.94 
American League  -0.006  -0.23  -0.006  -0.23  -0.006  -0.23  -0.006  -0.23  -0.006  -0.23  -0.006  -0.23 
Canadian  -0.022  -0.21  -0.022  -0.21  -0.022  -0.21  -0.022  -0.21  -0.022  -0.21  -0.022  -0.21 
Greater Metro Area Characteristics                          
Per cent White  0.001  0.34  0.001  0.34  0.001  0.34  0.001  0.34  0.001  0.34  0.001  0.34 
Per cent Black  0.005  1.24  0.005  1.24  0.005  1.24  0.005  1.24  0.005  1.24  0.005  1.24 
Per cent Hispanic  0.005  3.39  0.005  3.39  0.005  3.39  0.005  3.39  0.005  3.39  0.005  3.39 
Average Annual Income  0.000  1.45  0.000  1.45  0.000  1.45  0.000  1.45  0.000  1.45  0.000  1.45 
Population   0.000  0.11  0.000  0.11  0.000  0.11  0.000  0.11  0.000  0.11  0.000  0.11 
Year Dummies                         
1993  0.051  1.31  0.051  1.31  0.051  1.31  0.051  1.31  0.051  1.31  0.051  1.31 
1997  0.046  0.97  0.046  0.97  0.046  0.97  0.046  0.97  0.046  0.97  0.046  0.97 
1998  0.130  2.44  0.130  2.44  0.130  2.44  0.130  2.44  0.130  2.44  0.130  2.44 
Constant  0.994  1.63  0.830  1.37  0.100  1.65  0.824  1.34  0.888  1.44  0.902  1.48 
R-Squared  0.7360  0.7360  0.7360  0.7360  0.7360  0.7360 
F-Statistic  422.35 22, 2274  422.35 22, 2274  422.35 22, 2274  422.35 22, 2274  422.35 22, 2274  422.35 22, 2274 
Root Mean Squared Error  0.61289  0.61289  0.61289  0.61289  0.61289  0.61289 
Observations  2297  2297  2297  2297  2297  2297  20 
the non-competitive MLB market. While the standard prediction regarding the relationship 
between discrimination and monopsony power is that of a positive relationship, our results 
appear to indicate a generally negative relationship. While this may seem counterintuitive, it 
is certainly consistent with BO’s theoretical model, which is capable of predicting a negative 
relationship assuming certain parameter restrictions are in place. 
In Table 5 we explore BO’s theoretical prior that wage discrimination across player 
job  assignments  interacts  with  productivity  differences  between  majority  and  minority 
workers. We test this prediction by creating a Relative Productivity variable that equals the 
difference between a player’s individual productivity and the mean productivity of players in 
the other racial/position group multiplied by the player’s individual productivity. Thus, in 
Column  (1)  of  Table  5,  where  we  focus  on  white  pitchers  relative  to  black  hitters,  our 
Relative Productivity (White Pitcher:Black Hitter) variable is defined as: Individual White 
Pitcher  Productivity  x  (Individual  White  Pitcher  Productivity  -  Mean  Black  Hitter 
Productivity), where productivity is estimated according to the two-stage process outlined in 
equations (5)-(8). 
There is some tentative evidence from Tables 5 that relative productivity does affect 
ceteris paribus race-position salary differentials. Our empirical results suggest that whilst the 
white hitter / black pitcher, black hitter / white pitcher and black hitter / Hispanic pitcher 
wage differentials are unaffected by relative productivity differences, the differential of white 
and Hispanic hitters over black pitchers increases with the relative productivity of the former. 
Moreover, the differential of white pitchers over Hispanic Hitters declines with increases in 
the relative productivity of the latter. 
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Table 5: Discrimination Controlling for Position Specific Productivity and Relative Productivity (Hitters – Pitchers) 
Dependent Variable: Log Annual Salary 
 
(1) 
White Hitters / Black 
Pitchers 
(2) 
White Hitters / 
Hispanic Pitchers 
(3) 
Black Hitters / White 
Pitchers 
(4) 
Black Hitters / 
Hispanic Pitchers 
(5) 
Hispanic Hitters / 
White Pitchers 
(6) 
Hispanic Hitters / 
Black Pitchers 
  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat  Coef  T-Stat 
Imputed Productivity  0.635  10.38  0.950  10.27  0.862  23.55  1.012  10.48  0.838  22.05  0.730  10.17 
Race Dummies                         
White Hitters   -0.030  -0.47  -0.189  -2.75  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Black Hitters  -  -  -  -  -0.109  -2.57  -0.168  -2.24  -  -  -  - 
Hispanic Hitters  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.137  -2.42  0.052  0.70 
Relative Productivity                         
White Hitter: Black Pitcher  0.018  4.12  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
White Hitter: Hispanic Pitcher  -  -  -0.005  -0.84  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Black Hitter: White Pitcher  -  -  -  -  -0.000  -0.11  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Black Hitter: Hispanic Pitcher  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.004  -0.65  -  -  -  - 
Hispanic Hitter: White Pitcher  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.007  1.90     
Hispanic Hitter: Black Pitcher  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.018  3.65 
Constant  3.386  2.60  -0.211  -0.13  1.346  1.67  -1.800  -1.05  1.511  1.82  -0.096  -0.06 
R-Squared  0.7200  0.7727  0.7481  0.7347  0.7620  0.7840 
F-Statistic  132.29 19, 656  132.82 19, 664  321.88 19, 1289  104.98 19, 482  309.12 19, 1099  101.52 19, 284 
Root Mean Squared Error  0.61053  0.61184  0.60507  0.61840  0.59513  0.59260 
Observations  676  684  1309  502  1119  304 
Notes:  
1. Other explanatory regressors were those set out in Table 3;  
2. ‘Relative Productivity’ is defined as, e.g., ‘White Hitter: Black Pitcher = Individual White Hitter Productivity x (Individual White Hitter Productivity - Mean Black Pitcher Productivity). 
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3.4.  Decomposition Analysis 
In this section, we attempt to identify cross-assignment discrimination using another empirical 
approach.  The  fact  that  players  of  a  particular  race  in  a  particular  position  enjoy  a  wage 
differential over players of another race in another position could be a reflection of the former 
group’s greater endowment of ‘earning characteristics’. White pitchers may, for example, be 
more productive or have more experience on average than non-white (i.e. black or Hispanic) 
hitters.  Alternatively,  white  pitchers  may  be  better  rewarded  for  the  characteristics  they  do 
possess, suggesting some form of positive (negative) discrimination from employers towards 
white  pitchers  (non-white  hitters).  To  address  this  issue  we  perform  a  Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition to separate the earnings differential into an ‘endowment component’, to account 
for differences in endowments between individuals, and a ‘price component’, which is usually 
associated with discrimination.
10  
Recalling equation (7), we write the earnings function of players of race j in position i as: 
  (9) 
where  i = W,NW ( )  and  j = H,P ( )  denote  white  and non-white  and  pitchers  and  hitters 
respectively, and where  NW = B,H ( ) denotes black and Hispanic respectively.   
denotes our vectors of position-specific and common productivity characteristics,   
the  corresponding  coefficient  vectors  to  be  estimated,  and   e
ij some well-behaved error term. 
Thus, the earnings functions of white pitchers,  non-white pitchers, white hitters and  non-white 
hitters may be denoted: 
                                                 
10 This method of decomposition, initially proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and later generalized by Oaxaca and 
Ransom (1994), has been applied extensively to discrimination on the basis of gender, race, caste and religion.  23 
  (10) 
  (11) 
  (12) 
  (13) 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition divides wage differentials into a part that is ‘explained’ by 
group  differences  in  productivity  and  a  residual  part  that  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  such 
differences in wage determinants. This latter ‘unexplained’ component is often used as a measure 
for  discrimination.  For  example,  the  predicted  average  white  pitcher/non-white  hitter  (WP-
NWH) differential may be represented as: 
  (14) 
The first term,  , represents differences in endowments between members of 
the two groups whilst the second term,  , represents differences in rewards. 
Note that if the overall differential is negative (i.e.  ) but the second term is 
positive  [i.e.  ],  then  it  would  suggest  that  non-white  hitters  are 
discriminated against despite earning, on average, more than white hitters - i.e. non-white hitters 
would do even better with the earnings generating function of white pitchers than with their own.   24 
  Specification  (14)  presumes  that  the  non-white  hitter  wage  structure  prevails  in  the 
absence  of  discrimination.  But  this  is  a  matter  of  debate.  Assuming  away  any  feelings  of 
malevolence  or  benevolence  from  one  group  towards  the  other,  then  it  is  equally  valid  to 
presume that the white pitcher wage structure prevails, thereby requiring (14) to be re-specified 
as: 
  (15) 
The  first  and  second  terms  on  the  right  hand  side  of  (14)  still  represent  differences  in 
endowments and rewards respectively, but they will generally differ from those derived from 
equation (13).
11 Many authors concede this ambiguity by simply reporting both decompositions. 
Some,  however,  have  a ttempted  to  confront  the  issue  head -on  by  hypothesizing  the  non -
discriminatory parameter vector,  , directly.
12 Reimers (1983), for example, proposes using the 
average coefficients over both groups as an estimate of  . Neumark (1988) advocates using the 
coefficients from a pooled regression over both groups as an estimate of B. In what follows, we 
follow  the  ‘hybrid’  decomposition  technique  popularized  by  Cotton  (1988)  in  which  the 
prevailing non-discriminatory wage structure is assumed to be a weighted average of the wage 
structures of the two groups under consideration: 
  (16) 
where   represents the estimated non-discriminatory parameter vector, 
with   denoting the proportion of the sample comprised by white pitchers. The first right-hand 
                                                 
11 The point that an undervaluation of one group implies an overvaluation of the other is neatly summarized by Cotton (1988, p. 
238): ‘… not only is the group discriminated against undervalued, but the preferred group is overvalued, and the undervaluation 
of the one subsidizes the overvaluation of the other.’  
12 Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) provide an integrative treatment of the various methods.  25 
term in the decomposition is the overpayment enjoyed by white pitchers, the second term is the 
underpayment  suffered  by  non-white  hitters,  and  the  third  term  is  the  portion  of  the  wage 
differential  that  is  explained  by  differences  in  endowments.  We  perform  the  above  three 
decompositions  for  the  white  pitcher/non-white  hitter  and  white  hitter/non-white  pitcher 
differentials, and our results, based on the regressions set out in Table 4, are collected in Tables 
6a-6d. 
  Considering Table 6a, our regression model implies a positive salary premium for black 
hitters over white pitchers ceteris paribus. The first decomposition, which follows specification 
(14)  in  presuming  the  black  hitter  wage  structure  would  prevail  in  the  absence  of  any 
discrimination,  suggests  that  this  premium  would  be  even  greater  in  the  absence  of 
discrimination, with discrimination against black hitters alleviating the potential differential by 
some 33 percent. The second decomposition, which follows specification (15) in presuming that 
the white pitcher wage structure would prevail in the absence of discrimination, suggests that 
discrimination against black hitters alleviates the overall potential differential by a somewhat 
less, but still considerable, 22 percent. The hybrid decomposition, derived from specification 
(16), echoes the finding that discrimination assuages the potential black hitter wage premium 
with white pitcher overpayment and black hitter underpayment reducing the potential premium 
by approximately 9 per cent and 15 per cent respectively.  
  Table 6b focuses on the white pitcher / Hispanic hitter differential. Our results here imply 
a  positive  salary  premium  for  Hispanic  hitters  over  white  pitchers  ceteris  paribus.  The 
decomposition of this differential suggests even larger discrimination than that evident in the 
white pitcher / black hitter differential. Decomposition based on the white pitcher wage structure 
suggests that discrimination against Hispanic hitters reduces the potential Hispanic hitter   26 
Table 6a: Oaxaca-Cotton Decompositions: White Pitcher / Black Hitter 
 
  Coef.  % 
     
Black Hitter Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     -0.649  133.29 
Price Effect:     0.162  -33.29 
Total Differential:     -0.487  100.00 
     
White Pitcher Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     -0.591  121.49 
Price Effect:     0.104  -21.49 
Total Differential:     -0.487  100.00 
     
Hybrid Wage Structure     
White Pitcher Overpayment:     0.045  -9.33 
Black Hitter Underpayment:     0.075  -15.47 
Endowment Effect:     -0.607  124.80 
Total Differential:     -0.487  100.00 
Table 6b: Oaxaca-Cotton Decompositions: White Pitcher / Hispanic Hitter  
 
  Coef.  % 
     
Hispanic Hitter Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     -0.604  145.33 
Price Effect:     0.189  -45.33 
Total Differential:     -0.416  100.00 
     
White Pitcher Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     -0.512  123.12 
Price Effect:     0.096  -23.12 
Total Differential:     -0.416  100.00 
     
Hybrid Wage Structure     
White Pitcher Overpayment:     0.030  -7.17 
Hispanic Hitter Underpayment:     0.081  -19.46 
Endowment Effect:     -0.527  126.63 
Total Differential:     -0.416  100.00  27 
Table 6c: Oaxaca-Cotton Decompositions: White Hitter / Black Pitcher 
 
  Coef.  % 
     
Black Pitcher Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     0.660  105.27 
Price Effect:     -0.033  -5.27 
Total Differential:     0.627  100.00 
     
White Hitter Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     0.639  101.89 
Price Effect:     -0.012  -1.89 
Total Differential:     0.627  100.00 
     
Hybrid Wage Structure     
White Hitter Overpayment:     -0.006  -0.99 
Black Pitcher Underpayment:     -0.010  -1.53 
Endowment Effect:     0.643  102.52 
Total Differential:     0.627  100.00 
 
Table 6d: Oaxaca-Cotton Decompositions: White Hitter / Hispanic Pitcher  
 
  Coef.  % 
     
Hispanic Pitcher Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     0.859  145.76 
Price Effect:     -0.270  -45.76 
Total Differential:     0.589  100.00 
     
White Hitter Wage Structure     
Endowment Effect:     0.765  129.86 
Price Effect:     -0.176  -29.86 
Total Differential:     0.589  100.00 
     
Hybrid Wage Structure 
   
White Hitter Overpayment:     -0.053  -9.03 
Hispanic Pitcher Underpayment:     -0.141  -23.96 
Endowment Effect:     0.784  132.99 
Total Differential:     0.589  100.00  28 
premium by over 45 percent, whilst decomposition based on the Hispanic hitter wage structure 
puts the figure at 23 percent. The hybrid decomposition suggests that white pitcher overpayment 
and  Hispanic  hitter  underpayment  offset  the  potential  Hispanic  hitter  wage  premium  by 
approximately 7 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. 
  Tables 6c and 6d focus on the white hitter / black pitcher and white hitter / Hispanic 
pitcher decomposition. Both decompositions imply a positive salary premium for white hitters. 
Table 6c suggests that discrimination plays a relative minor role in the white hitter / black pitcher 
differential, discrimination against white hitters reducing the potential white hitter premium by 
just over 5 per cent according to the black pitcher wage structure, and just under 2 per cent 
according  to  the  white  hitter  wage  structure.  The  hybrid  decomposition  implies  white  hitter 
overpayment and black pitcher underpayment reduce the differential by 1 per cent and 1.5 per 
cent respectively. 
  It would appear that discrimination plays a much more significant role in the white hitter 
/  Hispanic  pitcher  differential.  According  to  Table  6d,  discrimination  against  white  hitters 
reduces the potential differential by 46 per cent according to the Hispanic pitcher wage structure 
and  by  30  per  cent  according  to  the  white  hitter  wage  structure.  The  hybrid  decomposition 
suggests that white hitter overpayment and Hispanic pitcher underpayment reduces the potential 
white hitter premium by 9 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. 
6.  Final Comments 
In this study, we address a widely neglected problem in the literature on taste discrimination in 
pay: Ascertaining the extent to which racial or gender differences in pay across job assignments 
are  attributable  to  prejudice.  Nearly  all  wage  discrimination  studies  have  focused  on  29 
discrimination within the same job assignment, thus treating whites and non-whites (or males 
and females) as perfect substitutes. In a recent contribution, BO extend the theory to the case of 
discrimination across job assignments where assignments are viewed as distinct inputs. BO’s 
theoretical findings underscore the importance of carefully considering the production function 
when there are productivity differences between majority and minority workers. An important 
finding  from  our  theoretical  analysis  is  that  the  magnitude  of  white/non-white  productivity 
differences influences the amount of discrimination. Furthermore, when whites and non-whites 
are  interrelated  in  production,  race  and  productivity  will  interact.  This  is  an  important 
implication,  for  it  means  that  whenever  white  and  non-white  workers  have  productivity 
differences,  the  researcher  should  include  productivity  x  race  interactions  in  any  empirical 
specification. 
We test BO’s model using data from Major League Baseball, an industry characterized 
by complementary job assignments, a history of racial integration and discrimination, and a dual 
labour market structure. We find convincing evidence of racial differences in pay across player 
job assignments, even after controlling for a wide array of demographic variables and position-
specific productivity. Moreover, we find strong evidence of BO’s theoretical prior that racial pay 
differentials across assignments are affected by changes in relative productivities. 
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Appendix:  Baseball Terminology 
1.  A player has an at bat every time he comes to bat, except in certain circumstances, e.g. if he is awarded first base due to 
interference or obstruction or the inning ends while he is still at bat.  
2.  A hitter is assigned a stolen base (also called a steal) when he reaches an extra base on a hit from another player. For 
example, suppose that hitter A is at first base when hitter B hits the ball. Hitter B reaches first base (he would be assigned a 
single), but hitter A reaches third base. Hitter A would be assigned a stolen base because he reached an extra base.  
3.  A base on balls (also called a walk) is assigned when the batter receives four pitches each of which the umpire determines is 
a ball. A ball is any pitch at which the batter does not swing and is out of the strike zone (which means it would not qualify 
to be a strike). When the hitter is assigned a base on balls, he is entitled to walk to first base.  
4.  Total bases are the number of bases a player has gained through hitting. It is the sum of his hits weighted by 1 for a single, 2 
for a double (if he gets to second base as a result of his hit), 3 for a triple (if he gets to third base) and 4 for a home run.  
5.  A hitter’s batting average is the ratio of hits to at bats; this measures the hitter’s success rate. Slugging percentage, a related 
measure, reflects hitting power, which is total bases divided by at bats. 
6.  An infielder is a defensive player who plays on the infield, the dirt portion of a baseball diamond between first and third 
bases. The specific infielder positions are first baseman, second baseman, shortstop (which is between second and third 
bases) and third baseman. In contrast, an outfielder plays farthest from the batter and his primary role is to catch long fly 
balls. Outfielder positions include left fielder, center fielder and right fielder. The catcher crouches behind home plate and 
receives the ball from the pitcher. Because the catcher can see the whole field, he is best positioned to lead and direct his 
fellow players in play. He typically calls the pitches by  means of hand signals, hence requires awareness of both the 
pitcher’s mechanics and the strengths and weaknesses of the batter. 
7.  A pitcher is assigned a win or a loss depending on whether he was the pitcher of record when the decisive run was scored. 
One is the pitcher of record if one is the pitcher at the point when the player who scores the decisive run is allowed to reach 
a base.   31 
8.  Games started is the number of times the pitcher was given the ball to start a game, whereas games finished is the number of 
times the pitcher was throwing on the mound during the final out (which is any failed attempt by a hitter to advance to a 
base).  
9.  A shutout is a game in which one team does not score any runs. A pitcher earns a save if he is able to hold a lead for his 
team at the end of the game.  
10.  Pitchers who earn saves, called relievers, tend not to gain wins, so it is customary to treat saves and wins equally, especially 
when studying pitcher salaries.  
11.  Number of home runs, which is assumed to be negatively related to salary, is the number of pitches that were hit by batters 
which were scored as a home run.  
12.  A pitcher is assigned a walk, which is assumed to be negatively related to salary, if he allows a batter to reach base after 
pitching him four balls. He is assigned a  strikeout if he pitches three strikes (pitched balls counted against the batter, 
typically swung at and missed or fouled off) in a row.  
13.  An inning is one of nine periods in a MLB game in which each team has a turn at bat; innings pitched is the number of such 
periods when the pitcher was working.  
14.  Earned run average is negatively correlated with the pitcher’s ability to prevent the opposing team from scoring. It equals 
the number of times the pitcher allows a batter to score a run (where the batter scores a point by advancing around the bases 
and reaching home plate safely) x 9, divided by the number of innings pitched.  
15.  The strikeout rate is the percentage of times the pitcher has succeeded in striking a batter out. 
 
 